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1. Introduction 
In the last few years, economic geography has recovered a relevant role in the world of 
politics. The continous changes in the frontiers of many countries, or the possibility of 
economic integration, are facts that have contributed to this general interest. Geography 
plays an important role in the context of international economics. Clearly, the situation 
of a country is different if it is adjacent to a world power instead of to a small country. 
Moreover, it is different to be linked to the core of an international economic area instead of 
to the periphery. It is important to realize that relationships between countries are affected 
by spatial dimension. Countries are not dimensionless points, and, in fact, different 
relations between them imply the emergence of different urban and industrial location 
patterns. So, for example, Livas Elizondo and Krugman (1992) justify the existence of 
large cities in developing countries, as the case of Mexico D.C., by the strong backward 
and forward linkages that emerge from selling fundamentally to the domestic market. 
They suggest that a more liberal policy would contribute to the existence of more cities, 
or in other words, cities of a smaller size. At the same time, one can think that a country 
mainly serving a foreign market will have its industries near borders, in order to spend less 
on transportation, while if it serves to domestic market, its industries will be located near 
large markets, which are not necesarilyat the borders. In order to analyze these situations 
it is necessary to previously obtain the principal factors that favor the agglomeration of 
economic activities. 
In the last few years, some articles have tried to explain this fact through formal 
microecomic models. In fact, Krugman, for example, presents several works in this line 
of research, where cities emerge from the interactions among individuals. In this essay 
we present a variation of one of these models (Krugman 1993). In his model, agglom-
eration emerges from three sources: the existence of economies of scale at a firm level, 
transportation costs, and the mobility of labor. Increasing returns to scale imply that 
the production of each good will take place in a single location. On the other hand, the 
existence of transportation costs means that the best locations for a firm will be those 
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with easy access to markets. These places are those where products are concentrated. But 
in this model not all factors are mobile, farmers are immobile and they are the centrifugal 
force that breaks agglomeration. 
However, farmers do not seem to be the force that is putting a stop to the growth of 
cities. Furthermore, if farmers are playing the role of immobile factors such as land it is 
ad hoc to assume that they produce an agricultural good that is mobile, as happens in 
the cited model. Since the underlying idea is that this mobile agricultural good can make 
the returns to land in region 1 easily transfereable to region 2, this is not realistic. 
We are interested in explaining the formation of cities in the context of an urban soci-
ety, where peasants are not a strong proportion of the population, and where international 
trade plays an important role in the configuration pattern of a country. 
For these reasons, our model takes off from Krugman's since it maintains the same 
centripetal forces, but it departs from it regarding centrifugal forces. We introduce two 
kinds of centrifugal forces, one global and another local. The first one is represented by 
the existence of foreign countries. The population size of these countries will affect the 
location and size of cities in our country of interest. If foreign countries are big, our 
country will mainly serve the exterior market and the cities will appear near borders. 
On the other hand, if foreign countries are small, our country will mostly sell in the 
domestic market, and their cities' location will depend on historic events, i.e., they will 
appear where there are more people, which can depend on historical reasons. The second 
centrifugal force is due to the existence of congestion costs. Big cities have urban traffic 
problems, pollution or high housing prices that make small cities more attractive places 
to live in. All these negative effects of agglomeration are included under the paragraph 
of congestion costs. When congestion costs are high more cities exist. 
The Heckscher-Olin trade model has dominated work in the theory of international 
trade for years. However, since World War Il, the largest and fastest growing component of 
world trade has been the exchange of manufactures between the industrialized economies, 
fact that cannot be explained by the H-S model. As a result, a new framework for 
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analyzing trade was needed. Some recent works have given an alternative explanation 
of international trade. So, Krugman (1979), for example, develops a formal model in 
which trade is caused by economies of scale instead of differences in factor endowments 
or technology. His approach differs from that of other formal treatments of trade under 
increasing returns, which assume that scale economies are external to firms so that markets 
remain perfectly competitive. In his model the existence of economies of scale implies that 
both the variety of goods that one country can produce and the scale of its production 
are constrained by the size of the market. However, if each country trades with other 
ones, nations will be not constrained by their own market size, because the world market 
is larger than each individual national market. In this way, each country can specialize 
in producing a smaller number of products than it would in the absence of trade, but 
by buying goods it does not make from other countries, each nation can simultaneously 
increase the variety of goods that its citizens can consume. So, trade offers an opportunity 
for mutual gain even when countries do not differ in their resources or technology. 
Within this same framework, our model is based on a simplest version of Krugman 
(1980), where gains from trade occur because the world economy produces a greater 
diversity of goods than would either country alone, offering each individual a wider range 
of choice. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the assumptions of the 
model and the short-run equilibrium. In section 3 we analyze the long-run equilibrium 
in the case of three cities and in the multiple case. In fact, we discuss the effects that 
the size of foreign countries, the transportation parameter and congestion costs have 
over the urban pattern of the country of study. In section 4 we present some welfare 
implications derived from investments in transportation infrastructure and the existence 
of trade barriers. Finally, section 5 concludes and suggests some extensions to the model. 
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2.1. Assumptions of the model 
The model consists of a long-narrow economy with three countries, two of them exterior 
and one interior. In each of the exterior countries there is only one city. The location 
and size of this city are given, i.e., we assume that they are fixed. We are interested in 
studying the location and size of cities in the interior country. 
One fundamental aspect that distnguishes the relationship between regions from that 
between countries is the restrictions to the movements of some factors. Usually, factors 
such as capital or labor have not free mobility between countries. For this reason, in this 
model we consider that every country has a fixed population, and that it is impossible for 
a worker to change the country where he is working. But, on the other hand, within our 
country of interest there are different regions or cities, and the workers in this country 
can move across them without any restriction. However, these countries are not closed 
economies, but have trade between them, and we study how this trade affects the location 
and size of cities in the interior country. 
We assume an economy with a large number of potential goods that appear in the 
utility function in a symmetric way. All consumers have the same CES tastes: 
where the elasticity of substitution between any two goods, a, is greater than 1. 
Individuals of the interior country may move across J{ different cities in their country, 
but they can not move to foreign cities. In each of the exterior countries there is only one 
city. 
Let Aj be population in city j at any point in time. 
There is only one factor of production: labor. All goods are produced under economies 
of scale \Vi th the same technology 
Lij = 0: + /3xij (0: > 0,/3 > 0) 
where Lij is the number of workers needed to produce Xij units of good i in city j. 
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We assume full employment in each city at any time, so L-i Lij = Aj. 
In this model we introduce transportation and congestion costs. Following Krugman, 
they take the iceberg form. This means that a fraction of any good produced by a firm 
disappears before this good arrives to the consumer. One share melts because of the 
transportation cost between cities and the other melts because of the negative effects 
of every city (pollution, housing prices, transportation costs within the city ... ) that are 
included under the paragraph of "congestion". So, if a unit is shipped from city j the 
amount that consumers placed in city k can consume is only e-rDjk-"YAk, T being the 
parameter of transportation costs, , the parameter of congestion, and Djk the distance 
between cities j and k. In the particular case where good i is produced in city k any 
consumer living in the same city can obtain only a proportion e--Y>'k of each unit of good 
z. We can see that the city size affects the loss due to agglomeration. 1 
Finally, we suppose that individuals in the interior country move toward locations 
with higher real wages, the law of motion being: 
where Wk is the real wage in city k and w = L-k tj~: Aj Wk is the average real wage in the 
interior country and J( = are the locations in the interior country. 
2.2. Short-run equilibrium 
Drawing on Starret's spatial impossibility theorem, Fujita indicates that there are only 
two kinds of models which can explain the endogenous formation of cities: non-price inter-
action models and non-competitive models. The model discussed here, one of monopolistic 
competition, is included in the last group. 
Economies of scale (due to the existence of fixed costs) in production imply that every 
1 We can treat intra-urban congestion in a more explicit way, such as land consumption and/or traffic 
congestion in cities. But, such an extension would not significantly change the main conclusions of this 
paper. Therefore, we take the simplest form of urban congestion. 
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good is produced in only one location, so that different cities have different goods. 
To determine the profit-maximizing behavior of firms it is important to stress the fact 
that there are two types of demands: the demand of individuals living in the city where 
the good is produced and the demand of other cities (national or foreign). One must 
remember that all goods appear in the utility function in a symmetric way, which means 
that all goods are consumed. The main point is that both demands have the same price 
elasticitya. For this reason transportation and congestion costs (which make consumers 
in different cities pay different prices for the same good) do not alter the strategy of firms. 
It can be shown that the first order condition implies 
a 
Pij = Wj(3--1 ' 
a-
where Wj is the wage rate in city j. So, we have that all f.o.b. prices are the same within 
a city. 
Since there is monopolistic competition firms enter the market until profits are zero. 
All this implies that 
(a-1)£ d' d' . Xij = a fi or every goo t an CIty J. 
As every firm produces the same quantity and has the same technology, the number of 
firms in city j, nj, will be proportional to its population: nj = nAj, where n is the number 
of goods in the whole economy. This value might be obtained by dividing the number of 
workers in the economy by the number needed in each firm. 
In this section we assume that workers cannot move to other locations (neither national 
nor foreign) and we obtain the wage rate for each city. In order to do this we modify the 
units of goods such that Pij = Wj, which means that (3 should be equal (u~l) in the cost 
function for each firm. 
Suppose that we have a numeraire good at j = 1. Then, all prices in this location will 
be 1, and therefore WI = 1. 
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Following Krugman we define the true price index at j as 
1 
Tj = [~.\,( w,e ,D"h' j )1-. 1 '-0 (1) 
We can prove that 
1 
Wj = [~Yk(e-('Dj'h")r.t-'l'; , (2), 
where Yj is the income of city j and 
(3) 
Then, for a given distribution of the population, we can calculate the wage rate for 
each city. To do so we only need to introduce the parameters of taste for variety (0') 
and transportation and congestion parameters (T and 0', respectively) in the preceeding 
equations. 
3. Long-run equilibrium 
We are now interested in knowing what happens in our economy if workers in the interior 
country can move across its national cities. Actually, we will try to explain how the 
congestion cost and the sizes of the foreign countries affect the location and size of cities 
in the country of study. The force that may move workers from one place to another is the 
real wage, defined as the ratio between the wage rate and price index, namely Wj = wjTj- l . 
Using the dynamic process described above we know that workers move to cities with real 
wages above the average real wage, and that they move away from cities with real wages 
below average. 
We can define equilibrium as any distribution of population between the different 
locations in the interior country such that Wj = W for each j with .Aj =j:. 0 and Wj ::; W 
otherwise. 
Vye can begin by analytically studying the case of three possible locations in the 
interior country and later we will discuss the case of more than three cities, in fact, seven 
locations, in numerical examples. 
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3.1. The three cities case 
Let us suppose three possible locations in our country of interest one in the center of the 
country and the others near each border. Namely locations 2, 3 and 4. 
Let 1 and 5 be the locations of the foreign cities. We assume that the distance between 
location 1 and 5 is 1, and that the three countries have the same length. Each country 
is specialized in the production of different goods. But every individual in this economy 
needs to consume all world goods. For this reason each country imports goods from others, 
so it can benefit from the total variety of goods and at the same time export goods to 
other nations. Each location j has a population of )..j 
• 
1 2 3 4 5 
I I 
interior country 
Figure 1. Possible locations: borders and center 
We will do two different conjectures related to the location of cities in order to see what 
are the different forces: 
• First, we assume that in our country all workers are concentrated in location 3 
()..2 = )..4 = 0) and that )..1 = )..s. 
As already stated, Wl = 1, and equations (1) to (3) define the wage rates in each location. 




+A3W3e-rD23(u-l) (AlerD13 (1-U) + A3W31- u + A5erD3s(1-U)fl} -;; ... 
... {AlerD12 {1-U) + A3W~-u erD23 (1-u) + A5erD25{1-U)}0'~1 
W3 {Al(e- rD13 (U-l) + e-rD3S (U-l))(Al + A3W31- u erDIJ(l-u) + A5erDlS(1-U)fl + 
1 
+A3W3(,\lerD13(I-U) + A3W31- u + A5erD3S(I-U)fl} -;; ... 
. . . {AI e(rD13+"Y'\3)(I-u) + A3W~-u e "Y'\3(I-u) + A5 e (rD23+"Y'\3)(I-U)} 0'~1 • 
In general it is not easy to compare these two expressions. There are some terms of the 
real wage which are bigger in location 2 and other which are bigger in location 3. So, 
we shall just analyze two symmetrical cases. One is what happens if the population in 
exterior countries disappears (AI = A5 ~ 0) and the other one is what happens if the 
population in the interior country is very small (AI = A5 ~ ~). 
1. When exterior countries are negligible (AI = A5 ~ 0) real wages in location 2 and 3 
take the form 
-"Y W3 - e . 
Using these equations it is easy to prove that 
·f d l·f 7(20" - l)n W3 > W2 1 an on y 1 23 > 'Y. 0" 
So, concentration in the cent er of the country can be an equilibrium if and only if 
the above condition is verified. In other words, if congestion costs are sufficiently 
low in relation to transportation costs. We can also see that concentration is more 
likely when transportation costs (7) and the elasticity of substitution (0") are high. 
The explanation that justifies this result is the following: if there is no population 
in the exterior countries, the only centrifugal force that breaks agglomeration is the 
congestion cost. Workers in our country can not obtain higher real wages by mov-
ing away from concentration because there are no consumers elsewhere who could 
increase the demand of the good being shipped. So, as 7 increases any unilateral 
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deviation pays less, the gains due to this movement decrease and the losses increase. 
On the other hand, as (J increases the mark-up of any firm is lower, so there is less 
interest in a deviation from concentration. 
In the particular case where I = 0 there is always concentration in the central 
city. This result is equivalent to that obtained by Krugman when peasants, who are 
the centrifugal force in his model, disappear. And in that case, concentration also 
increases in T. However the variety parameter does not affect concentration in his 
model. 
2. We can see now what happens in our three-city economy when population in the 
interior country disappears (>'1 = >'5 ~ ~). In this case the real wage equations take 
the form 
W3 = 
After some algebraic operations it can be shown that 
\Vhich holds if and only if 
But the last inequality does not hold, since if we define x = efD12 (U-l) then we can 
write the above expression as follows 2 > x + ~, which is equivalent to (1 - x? < 0 
and we know that (1 - x? is always greater or equal to zero. So, the real wage in 
location 3 is always lower than that of location 2 and this means that concentration 
in the cent er of the country is not an equilibrium when the exterior countries are 
very large. There are two possibilities: either there is concentration in one frontier 
or there is dispersion. In other words, foreign countries are the global centrifugal 
force in this economy they attract cities of the interior country to the borders. In 
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this case, we obtain that concentration in the cent er decreases in a and in T. The 
reasons are clear: when transportation costs increase, borders are more attractive, 
and when goods are better substitutes being as close as possible to big cities (now 
foreign cities are the biggest) is the only way of increasing the market power. 
To better understand the centrifugal and centripetal forces in this model it is interest-
ing to focus not only on the possibility of concentration in the central location but also 
at the border . 
• For this reason, in what follows we will consider that the population in our country 
is concentrated in location 2 and that we are going to study the relationship between 
real wages in location 2 and 3. 
In this new context we analize the same previous extreme cases. 
1. First consider the case in which foreign population is negligible. Concentration 
in location 2 now implies an asymmetry in the model such that the wage rate in 
location 5 is not equal to 1, as in the above case. In fact, Ws < 1 because Wl = 1. 
We know that every firm produces the same quantity and that its f.o.b. prices are 
equal to the wage rates. Therefore, if f.o.b. prices in location 1 are equal to 1, f.o.b 
prices in location 5 must be less than 1 if firms wish to sell all the quantity that 
they produce (because of the higher transportation costs between location 2 and 5). 
If we write the real wage equations under the new conditions we can show (see 
appendix) that 
W2 > W3 if and only if 'Y < T{2a - 1) D23 
a 
and, for all the values of the parameters, W3 > W4. Then, the previous inequality 
warrants concentration in location 2. This condition is equal to the one we obtained 
when studying the case of concentration in the center. Moreover, it can be proved 
that the above condition is true independently of the locations of cities 2 and 3. 
\\le can therefore conclude that when exterior countries are not important, then 
concentration in a location takes place when the congestion cost is sufficiently small 
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in relation to transportation cost. In other words, if exterior countries are not 
important and congestion cost exists, a new city can appear near the biggest one if 
the distance between them is small. 
2. Let us now consider the case ).1 = ).S ~ ~. In this case, we saw that 
W3 > W2(= W4) iff ~ + x < 2 iff (x _1)2 < o. 
X 
When exterior countries are very big, we can conclude that an even distribution of 
population between both borders is always an equilibrium 2. 
So far we have seen the effects of foreign countries over the location of cities in the 
country studied in two extreme cases: ).1 = ).S ~ ~ and ).1 = ).s ~ o. 
Unfortunately, the model is too complicated for analytically solutions in a more general 
case. For this reason, in what follows we shall use numerical examples. We shall assume 
that the population in the country studied is 20% of the world population and we will 
see how the different parameters affect the location and size of cities. First, we consider 
T = 0.1 (small transportation cost), 'Y = 0.1 (small congestion cost) and (7 = 4 as 
the status quo. Secondly, we will modify the value of each parameter to see how the 
configuration· of cities changes. 
In the status quo we obtain only one stable equilibrium 
).; = 30.1 % ).; = 39.8% ).: = 30.1 % 
of the national population. 
In order to calculate the equilibria we can fix values for ).3 from 0 to 1 and study the 
real wage differential between cities 2 and 4 (W2 - W4) against the labor force in city 2 
()\2). For each value of ).3 this curve allows us to find possible equilibria between cities 2 
and 4 (when W2 - W4 = 0 or cases of concentration). For example, in the status quo when 
).3 = 0 we get the following curve 
2If we conveniently adjust the values of the parameters, dispersion between the two borders can emerge 
as a stable equilibrium. 
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xlO·~ Wage differential versus pupulation 
8r-~--~~--~~--~~--__ ~~ 








o 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
lambda 2 
Figure 2. Example of curve W2 - W4 versus A2' 
In this particular case we can see that the only possible equilibria is the distribution of 
population between the two locations. 
In these points (possible equilibria) we must check if W3 is equal, greater or lower than 
W2 and W4. Let us remember that a distribution of population between cities 2, 3 and 4 is 
an equilibrium if all cities with a population achieve the same real wage, and if locations 
without a population (if population ~ 0) offer a lower real wage than the others. 
In the previous example, when we check if an even distribution between locations 2 
and 4 is an equilibrium, we obtain that W3 = 0.9599 > 0.9510 = W2 = W4. Therefore, even 
distribution between locations 2 and 4 is not an equilibrium. 
With respect to (local) stability three points must be made: 
• If we only consider the case of two variables, Ai and Aj, any interior equilibrium is 
stable, with respect to these variables, if the real wage differential, Wi - Wj against 
Ai is downward-sloping at that point. In the previous figure, even distribution is 
stable. 
• If concentration is an equilibrium (and the real wage in that location is strictly 
higher than in the others) then it is stable. 
• If a distribution of population between two locations is a stable equilibrium with 
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respect to movements in these two locations, and its real wages are higher than the 
real wage in the location where there is no-one then it is stable. 
If we only increase transportation parameter, T = 0.5 we obtain that three (locally) 
stable equilibria emerge: 
A; = 100% A; = 0% A: = 0% 
A; = 0% A; = 100% A: = 0% 
A; = 0% A; = 0% A: = 100%. 
vVe can see that, when transportation costs are relative high with respect to congestion 
costs, concentration appears. This result is consistent with that obtained in the limit case 
where foreign population was close to O. Transportation cost is therefore a centripetal 
force, because it favors agglomeration. 
If we simply change congestion parameter, I = 0.5 we can see that the only stable 
equilibrium is 
A; = 32.8% Ai = 34.4% A: = 32.8%. 
We now observe that the effect of congestion is bigger and this implies more dispersion 
between the three cities. Congestion cost is another centrifugal force, because it breaks 
agglomeration. 
But each of these two parameters, by itself, does not imply concentration or dispersion. 
It is the interaction of then both, the relative value of one respect to the other, which 
implies concentration or dispersion. So, if we simultaneously change T = 0.5 and 1=0.5 
the resulting stable equilibrium is 
A; = 33.2% A; = 33.6% A: = 33.2%. 
vVe have that only when the transportation parameter increases (T = 0.5, I = 0.1) then 
concentration exists, but if the congestion parameter also increases (T = 0.5, I = 0.5) 
then dispersion exists. We can see that concentration or dispersion emerges as the final 
equilibrium, as the result of interaction between transportation and congestion costs. 
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The effect of parameter (J' (elasticity of substitution between any two goods) is less 
clear. On the one hand, it makes the effect of congestion less important. So, for given 
congestion and transportation parameters, more concentration is obtained as (J' increases 
(as was obtained in the case of no population in foreign countries). On the other hand, 
when (J' increases, the cent er is less important (as seen in the case of total population in 
foreign countries, the real wage in the cent er is progressively lower than the real wage at 
the borders, as the elasticity of substitution increases). We can observe these ideas in the 
following examples. 
If (J' = 1.1 the unique stable equilibrium is 
A; = 31.2% A; = 37.6% A: = 31.2%. 
If (J' = 20 the unique stable equilibrium is 
And when (J' = 40 then we have two stable equilibria 
A; = 100% Ai = 0% A: = 0% 
A; = 0% Ai = 0% A: = 100%. 
We have seen above that if transportation cost is relatively high with respect to congestion 
cost, T = 0.5, ,= 0.1 and(J' = 4, then concentration emerges in the three possible locations 
because the effect of congestion is weaker. 
If we make (J' = 1.1 we obtain two stable equilibria, namely 
A; = 60% A; = 40% A: = 0% 
A; = 0% A; = 40% A: = 60%. 
In this latter case we observe that when (J' is small (close to 1) the effect of congestion is 
more important than when (J' = 4, and more dispersion appears. 
15 
3.2. The multiple case 
In this section we assume that there are seven possible locations in the interior country, 
locations 2 and 8 being the borders. The cities in the exterior countries are located in 
1 and 9 respectively. One of the exterior countries begins in location 1 and finishes in 
location 2 and the other one begins in location 8 and finishes in location 9. The three 
countries have the same length and the distance between cities 1 and 9 is 1. 
0: 
1 2 345 678 9 
I I 
interior country 
Figure 3. Case of multiple locations 
As in the previous section, in our country of interest workers can move across national 
locations, but they cannot move to foreign cities. Given an initial distribution of the 
population, we are interested in knowing the long-run equilibrium. To obtain this we 
must use the law of motion of workers defined above. The law implies that workers move 
away from cities with real wages -lower the average real wage- and move to cities with real 
wages higher than average. There are several factors that influence this final equilibrium: 
transportation parameter T, congestion cost ,/, the taste for variety a and the national 
population size. In the following examples we maintain national size at 20% of the world 
population, as in the above three-cities case, and will explain the different effects of the 
other parameters. Let us consider an initial distribution arbitrarily chosen 
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To easily understand the effects of the different parameters we will keep this initial dis-
tribution fixed at the following. 
When T = 0.1, 'Y = 0.1,0' = 4 the long-run equilibrium is 
>.; = 3.62% >'i = 11.1 % >'4 = 17.45% >.; = 20.87% >.~ = 20.54% >.; = 16.56% >.; = 9.85%. 
The initial advantage of the right side of the country implies that the biggest cities appear 
there in the long equilibrium. Obviously, bigger cities have an initial advantage, which 
influences the final solution. But there are other factors that influence the result. For 
example, location 2 has the same initial size as location 6. However, in the long-run, the 
size of location 6 is about six times that of location 2. This is because of the size of its 
closest cities. 
If we slightly modify T = 0.11 then the new long-run equilibrium is 
>.; = 0% >'i = 5.99% >'4 = 14.76% >.; = 21.03%'>'~ = 23.21% >.; = 20.74% >.; = 14.21%. 
Thus, it is clear that the transportation parameter favors concentration, in other words, it 
is a centripetal force. When T= 0.1 the biggest city has 20.87% of the national population, 
while this is about 23.21% when T = 0.11. And not only does the biggest city increase, 
but the population is agglomerated in a lower number of cities. 
As we could imagine, the congestion parameter is another centrifugal force (in addition 
to foreign countries). Actually, it is a local centrifugal force, since its effect is to stop the 
growth of the biggest cities. The congestion parameter does not increase the advantage 
of any movement to some other market, as the foreign size effect does. We observe that 
the existence of congestion cost leads to patterns with different sized cities. For example, 
if'Y = 0.11 the long-run equilibrium is 
>.; = 5.35% >.; = 12% >.: = 17.13% >.; = 19.97% >.~ = 19.46% >.; = 15.93% >.; = 10.13%. 
In Krugman's model cities were the same size in the long-run equilibrium. So, we can 
conclude that this model presents more diverse urban configurations as possible equilibria. 
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\iVith respect to the taste for variety (J, we obtain, in the above case, that when (J = 4.1 
more concentracion appears. So, when (J = 4.1 the long-run equilibrium is 
A; = 3.5% A; = 11.02% A4 = 17.43% A; = 20.89% A~ = 20.6% A; = 16.64% A; = 9.92%. 
The explanation may be that when variety is less important ((J is higher) moving away 
from concentration can decrease the market power of the moving firm (as seen in the three 
cities case). On the other hand, when goods are better substitutes, the bigger the city 
the fewer goods it imports from others. In other words, the advantage of agglomeration 
Increases. 
4. Welfare and policy implications 
In the previous section we saw that different transportation parameters involve different 
spatial configurations. However we have not yet discussed the different welfare levels im-
plied in each parameter value. We assume that our country's government can undertake 
different policies to improve the utility of its citizens. One of them consists of carrying 
out investments in infrastructures such as transportation (constructing highways between 
cities for example) or improving urban structures (offering good public transportation 
within cities, among others). This kind of study is analytically discussed by Alonso Villar 
(1994) using a simple model with only one country. In the present paper we merely show 
some numerical examples of the effect of investments in transportation over national wel-
fare. Furthermore, investments in infrastructures are not the only policy the government 
can implement. In this section we present some effects on the pattern configuration, and 
therefore on the social welfare produced by the existence of trade barriers. In fact, we 
only wish to remark that trade barriers can involve spatial consequences and that conse-
quently this is a factor to take into account when the government implements this kind 
of policy. We will see that national policies may, undeliberately, encourage development 
in the biggest cities. We begin by studying the effects of improvements on transportation 
infrastructure within our country and later we will show what happens if we introduce 
trade barriers into this model. 
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In the following examples we can observe how the real income of our country changes 
with 7. \;Ye assume that when one good is delivered from a city in the interior country 
to a city in the foreign country (or the opposite) two transportation parameters must be 
taken into account: the parameter of the interior country (71) and that of the exterior 
country (72). However, we assume that in order to transport one good from a city in one 
of the exterior countries to the other it is not necessary to cross the interior country. So, 
in this case the transportation parameter used is that of the exterior countries, which we 
assume are equal (see the appendix B). 
We shall consider the same three-cities economy, where the population of the interior 
country is 20% or the world population. The rest of the parameters are: 71 = 72 = 
0.5, I = 0.1, a = 4. Using these parameter values in the long-run we get three stable 
equilibria: concentration in each location. The average real wage is about 0.8152 when 
we consider concentration in location 3 and it is about 0.8213 in the other cases. Real 
income in the country is the population size multiplied by the average real wage (in an 
equilibrium all workers obtain the same real wage, so the average real wage coincides with 
the real wage of every worker). Therefore, in order to compare different real incomes in 
the same sized country it is enough to compare their average real wages. 
If the government of our country invests some resources in transportation in such a 
way that its new transportation parameter is now 71 = 0.1 then, in the long-run, the 
following stable equilibrium emerge: 
>.; = 28.4% >.; = 43.2% >.: = 28.4%. 
Note that there is more dispersion because transportation decreases. Moreover, invest-
ment does not only affect the pattern of configuration, but also welfare. In fact, the 
average real wage is now 0.8732. 
This is only an example of the possibility of improving in the social welfare of a country 
when the government carries out investments in transportation infrastructure. It would 
be necessary to introduce a tax into this model in order to properly study the effect of a 
change in infrastructure, but this is not the principal aim of our paper. 
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On the other hand, investments in transportation are not the only policy the gov-
ernment can choose. The existence of trade barriers can produce different impacts on 
the pattern of configuration, which depends, among other things, on the transportation 
infrastructure. 
We assume that this barrier only affects the imports, and not the exports, of the 
interior country (see the appendix B). When the population in the interior country is 
20% and T = 0.1, 'Y = 0.1,0' = 4 we already know that three cities exists in the long-run, 
the size of both borders being about 30.1% of the national population (central location 
39.8%). If the government introduces a trade barrier such that importing goods is now 
more expensive than before, and if this barrier is sufficiently high, concentration increases3 . 
However, if trade barrier is small, dipersion can be obtained (what differs from Livas 
Elizondo and Krugman (1992)). If imported goods were four times more expensive in 
the long-run three cities would appear, each border being about 38.7% of the national 
population (central location 22.6%). And when the trade barrier is higher (imported 
goods are ten times more expensive) then two cities of identical size emerge at the borders 
(50%). But, in all cases, the welfare level decreases with the existence of a trade barrier. 
We are not trying to make a general recommendation. The important point to make that 
factors such as barriers can distort urban configuration, and this must be a non negligible 
aspect that a government should take into account when it wants to implement a policy 
to improve national welfare. 
5. Conclusions and extensions 
In this paper we have developed a monopolistic competition model that explains the sizes 
and locations of cities as a consequence of centrifugal and centripetal forces. Our interest 
was to present a framework which allows us to study the principal causes that favor 
3This result is consistent with that obtained by Livas Elizondo and Krugman. They justify the 
existence of large cities in developing countries, as is the case of Mexico D.e., by the strong backward 
and forward linkages that emerge from import-substituting industrialization policies. 
20 
agglomeration and those which hinder it in current societies, where peasants are not a 
large proportion of the total population and where international relationships substantially 
affect the inner structure of a country. 
The centrifugal forces are due to the existence of foreign countries which our country of 
interest trades with, and to the effect of congestion costs. On the one hand, foreign nations 
make concentration in just one city difficult, because each of them constitutes an opposite 
cent er of attraction. On the other hand, they attract firms from the interior country to 
the borders, especially if the interior country is small. This centrifugal force underlines 
the effects that international trade has over the configuration of cities. Congestion costs 
are the local centrifugal force that stops the growth of the biggest cities, which are affected 
by congestion in a higher proportion. 
The centripetal forces are due to transportation costs, the existence of economies of 
scale and the mobility of workers in the national sphere. Transportation costs make 
concentration easier, because a smaller share is spent in transportation when goods are 
concentrated in the same city. Increasing returns to scale imply that the production of 
each good takes place in a single location. 
In this context we analyze the effects of different parameters on the urban pattern. 
We reveal, with some numerical examples, the improvement of society when the govern-
ment carries out investments in transportation infrastructure, and we also point out the 
importance of a general analysis of the consequences of international relationships on the 
national configuration. 
This framework allows us to answer some other questions posed as possible exten-
sions. One of them is to obtain more general conclusions on the repercussions of trade 
barriers on urban configuration and how they depend on the differences in transportation 
infrastructures of the trading countries. Another unsolved question is what this model 
says about integration. If we were to have two interior countries instead of one, each of 
them with different transportation parameters and a different number of workers (and 
therefore, of firms), it would be interesting to know what the final location of cities would 
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be if there were free mobility of the labor factor between them. 
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Appendix 
A. The wage rate 
We begin by solving the following problem: 
max (~I;·;'t 
s.t. LP~kC7 = m 
I 
where, cf is the consumption of good i by an individual of city k, good 1 is numeraire, 
P~k is the c.i.f. price paid by this individual for a unit of good i, and m = Wk is this 
individual's income. 
By calculating the first order conditions we obtain that 
This equation can be rewritten as follows: 
Using that aggregate consumption Cik = AkCf we can write 
, q 
, C k P2k Ck Pik i = --;u=r 2' 
Pik 
We define Yk = AkWk as the income of city k. This income is used to pay for goods 
consumed in this city, i.e. Yk = 2:i P~kC:, Combining the above expressions yields 
Rearranging, we have 
Yi ' 1-q 
, C k - kP2k (4) P2k 2 - '" , 1-q . 
L.Jj Pjk nj 
Let S2k be the expenditure in city k on goods produced in city 2, namely, S2k = n2p~kC~ 
(we are identifying good 2 with any good produced in city 2). 
23 
If we introduce equation (4) into S2k, then we add in k and use that Pjk = pjke(TDjd'YAk), 
we have that 
L S 2k = ).2 LYk(W2eTD2d'YAkTk-1)1-0", (5) 
k k 
where 
On the other hand, expenditures in each city have to equalize income, which means 
that 
L S2k = W2).2. 
k 
(6) 
By equalizing expressions (11 )and(12), we have the following equation if and only if ).2 -=I 0: 
1 
W, = [~Y,( e -(TD,,+,A')T,)U-l r 
In the case where ).2 = 0 we have to calculate the limit of W2 when ).2 ~ O. The 
continuity of functions that defines W2 implies that the above expression is also valid 
when ).2 = o. 
This proof can be repeated for a generic city j. 
B. Wage rates in a more general case 
Let us consider that the transportation parameter of the interior country (71) differs from 
that of the exterior countries (72)' So, when a good is shipped from one city to another, we 
must separate the transportation cost into the cost from the initial city to the border, and 
the cost from the border to the final city. We assume that transportation cost between 
foreign cities is only affected by 72. There are also trade barriers to imports by the 
interior country that are included by using parameter p, as a transportation cost. The 
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above equations obtained in appendix A can be written in the case of 7 possible locations 
in the country of interest as follows: 
8 
Ti = {AI e(T2 Dil +"YAl)(I-£1) + 2:: Aj( WjeT2Di2+TID2j+"YAi )1-£1 + Ag( Wge T2Did"YAl t-(1 )} l~oo 
j=2 
T j {Ale(T2PDI2+TIPD2i+"YAI)(I_£1) + t Aj(WjeT2Di2+TID2i+"YAi/-£1 
j=2 
1 
+Ag( WgeT2PDs9+TIPDsi+"YAl )(1-£1)} r=u 
Wj { Al (e -hD" +"D,i-hAd Tl )"-1 + t A jWj{ e -hD"H,D'i-hA;)Tj )"-1 
1 
+AgWg( e-(T2PDS9+TIPDSj+"Y>'I)Tg)(£1-l)} 1-00 
Wg {AI (e-(T2D I2+"YAl)T1t-
1 + t AjWj(e-(T2PDi2+TIPD2i+"Y>'i)Tjt-l 
j=2 
1 
+ AgWg( e -(T2DS9+"YAl)Tg) (£1-l)} 1-00 
where, i = 1,9 and j = 2, ... ,8. 
C. Calculus of the real wages in the three cities case 
Using equations (1) to (3) in the case of three possible locations in interior country 2, 3 
and 4 and assuming that in this country people are located in city 3 (A2 = A4 = 0) and 
that the population of foreign countries is equal, we have that 
Tl {AI (e"Y>'l /-£1 + A2( w2eTDI2+"Y>'1 )1-0" + A3( w3eTD13+"Y>'1 /-0" + 
1 
A4( W4 eTD14 +"YAl /-£1 + As( wseTDlS+"YAl )1-£1} r=u 
T2 {AI (eTD12+"Y>'2/-£1 + A2(W2e"YA2/-£1 + A3(W3eTD23"Y>'2/-£1 + 
1 
A4( w4eTD24+"YA2 /-£1 + As( wseTD2S+"YA2 /-£1} r=u 
T3 {AI (eTD13+"YA3)1-£1 + A2(W2eTD32+"Y>'3/-£1 + A3(W3e"YA3)1-£1 + 
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W1 1 
W2 { Al (eTD12 +"Y>'1 )l-U r:-1 + A2w2e"Y>'2(1-U)r;-1 + A3W3e(TD23+"Y>'3)(1-U)rg- 1 
1 
+),4W4e(TD24+"Y>'4)(1-U)r:-l + ),swse(TD2S+"Y>'S)(1-U)T;-1}-; 
W3 {AI (e TD13+"Y>'1 ) 1-u r:-1 + A2w 2e (TD23+"Y>'2)(1-u)r;-1 + ),3w 3eh>'3)(1-U)r;-1 + 
1 
),4W4e (TD34+"Y A4)(1-U)T:-1 + ),swse(TD3S+"YAS)(1-U)T;-1} -; . 
If we introduce expressions Tb T 2, T 3, T 4 , Ts in W2, W3 and take into account that Ws = 1 
(by symmetry) and that concentration in location 3 implies that ),2 = ),4 = 0, then we 
can write 
W2 {),1(eTD12 (1-U) + eTD2S (1-U»){),1 + ),3w~-UeTD13(1-U) + ),seTD1S(1-u)}-1 
1 
+ ),3W3e TD23(1-u) {),1 eT D13(1-u) + ),3w j-U + ),se TD3S (1-U)} -1 } -; 
W3 {A1(eTD13 (1-U) + e TD3S(1-U»){A1 + A3W~-u eTD13 (1-u) + AseTD3S (1-U)}-1 
1 
+A3W3{ Al eTD13 (1-u) + A3W~-u + AseTD3S (1-U)} -1 };; 
T2 _ {A1eTD12 (1-U) + A3w~-ueTD23(1-U) + As(eTD2S )1-U} 1':'" 
T3 {A1 e (TD12 +"YA3)(1-U) + A3W31-ue"YA3(1-u) + As(eTD3S+"YA3)1-U}1~"', 
To obtain the real wages we must divide the rate wages by the price index. So, we can 
obtain 
W2 {A1(e-TD12 (U-1) + e-TD2S (U-1»)(A1 + A3W31- u e TD13 (1-u) + AseTDlS(1-U)f1 + 
1 
+A3W3e-TD23(U-1)(A1eTD13(1-u) + A3W31- U + AseTD3s(1-U)f1};; ... 
'" {A1eTD12(1-U) + A3w~-ueTD23(1-U) + AseTD2S (1-U)}.,.:'1 
W3 _ {A1(e- TD13 (U-1) + e-TD3S (U-1»)(A1 + A3W31-UeTD13(1-u) + AseTDlS(1-U)f1 + 
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1 
+A3W3(AleTD13(1-U) + A3W 31- u + AseTD35(1-U)fl}; ... 
... {Ale(TD13 +"Y'\3)(1-u) + A3W~-U e"Y'\3(1-U) + ASe(TD23+"Y'\3)(1-u)} .,.:'1. 




[1] Alonso Villar, 0., 1994, "Configuration of cities: the effects of congestion 
and government", mimeograph, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
[2] Fujita, M., 1993, "A monopolistic competition and urban systems", European 
Economic Review, 37, 308-315. 
[3] Krugman, P., 1979, "Increasing returns, monopolistic competition, and in-
ternational trade", Journal of International Economics, 9, 469-480. 
[4] -, 1980, "Scales economies, product differentiation, and pattern of trade", 
American Economic Review, 70, 950-959. 
[5] -, 1991, "Increasing returns and economic geography", Journal of Political 
Economy, 99, 483-499. 
[6] -, 1992, "A dynamic spatial model", National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 4219. 
[7] -, 1993, "First nature, second nature and metropolitan location", Journal 
of Regional Science, 33, 129-144. 
[8] -, 1993, "On the number and location of cities", European Economic Re-
view, 37, 293-298. 
[9] Livas Elizondo, R., Krugman, P., 1992, "Trade policy and the third world 
metropolis", Nacional Bureau of Economic Research, 4238. 
[10] Starret, D., 1978, "Market allocation of location choice in a model with free 
mobility", Journal of Economic Theory, 17, 412-436. 
28 
